PAGE FOURTEEN ft THE VI In the latter part of March, 1917,] I was stationed i dent of the Naval War College, and theyre | received a message from the Navy Department summoning me im- mediately to WashingténeThe form in which these instructions were cast showed that something extraordinary was impending. The orders read to come as unostentatiously as possible; '¥¢ keep my movements secret: and to this end I was not to appear at the Navy Department, but to telephone headquarters upon arrival. It took only a few minutes to explain why I had been sent for. It seemed prob- able that we should soon be at war with Germamy. Ambassador Page |, had' cabled that under the existing}: circumstances the American Navy should be represented in England by an officer of higher rank than any of those who were stationed there at that time. The Department, therefore, wished me to leave immediately and to get in touch with the British Ad- miralty, and learn how we could best and most quickly co-operate in the naval war, Since we were still tech- nically at peace with Germany Mr. Daniels insisted that there should be no publicity about our movements. I was still to remain ostensibly as head of the War College, and, in order that no suspicions should be aroused, my wife and family were still to oc- :upy the official residence of its presi- dent. 1 was to sail on a merchant | vessel, travelling under an assumed] name, to wear civilian clothes and to/ take no uniform. On reaching the sther side I was fo get immediately n contact with the British navy, and 0 send to Washington detailed re- sorts on existing conditions, Twe days after -this Washington two commonplace look- :retly bearded the American steam- ship Ne* York. They appeared up- on the passenger list as V. J. Richard- t son and S. W, Davidson. A day cr iwo out an enterprising steward, hav- ing noticed that the initials on the pajamas of one of these passengers liffered from those of the name under which he was sailing, reported him 0 the captain as a suspicious char- icter, The captain, however, had a quiet laugh over this discovery, for he knew that Mr. Davidson was Rear- Admiral Sims, of the United States Navy, and that his companion with the several sets of conflicting initials was Commander J. V. Babcock, the Admiral's aide. The voyage itself was uneventful, but a good deal of history was made in the short time that we spent upon the ocean. Two days before the ship reached England, President Wilson had gone before Congress and asked for the declaration of a state of war | with Germany. That a state of war | existed became apparent as we ap- proached Liverpool, for at the outer . harbor our vessel was mined. The damage was not irreparable, but the passengers were transferred to an- other steamer, and we safely reached port, where I found a representative of the British Admiralty, Rear-Ad- miral Hope, waiting to receive me. The Admiralty had also provided a special train. in which' we left im- mediately for London. Submarine Losses Appalling. Whenever I think of the naval situ- ation as it stood in April, 1917, 1 al- ways have before my mind two-con- trasting pictures, that of the British public, as represented in their press and in their social gatherings in Lon- don, and the other that of British officialdom, as represented in my con- fidential meetings with British states- men and British naval officers. For the larger part the English newspap- ers were. publishing optimistic state- ments about the German submaring campaign. They generally scouted the idea that this new form of piracy really threatened in any way the saf- ety of the British Empire. These va- ther ¢ outgivings were ac- companied by woesly statistics of submarine sinkings--figures which, while not particularly reassuring, hardly indicated that any serious in- roads had yet been made ou the Bri- tish reantile marine. The Admir- alty Was publishing tables showing that four or five thousand ships were arriving at British ports and leaving them everv week, while other tubles disclosed ths number of British ships under sixween hundred tons anc more than n hundred tons that were own every seven days, Thus week that arrived I learned from these figures that Great Britain had lost seventeen ships above that size, and two ships below; that 2,406 vessels had arrived at British ports, and that 2,367 had left, and that, in addition, seven fishing vessels had fal- victims to the German subma- vines. Such figures were worthless, : Jor they did not include neutral ships «and did not give the amount of ton- nage unk--dotalls, of 'course, which it was necessary to keep from the . Consequently these results as published did alarmi t I C mot seem particularly ping, newspapers all over the British Isles were drawing favorable conclusions from these statistics; here and there one of them sounded a more apprehensive note; yet the generally prevailing feeling was that the su rine cam had al fail that Gern S "Jas to win the war co that peace would and probably not be long delayed! These |gunne pers found m satisfaction in the fact that the "volume of British ship- pine was maintained," and such lines provement continues, as. well as the raging speeches ot certain British statesmen, YT Shded quiet popular apprehension. I found this i Sahar of cheerful ig- norance - ev ere in London soclety. The fear of = Ger man submarines was not disturbing the London season, at Newport as presi- | ¢ that might be appear losses, ning the of thé British navy. on ordnance and which I I--Black Days which had now reached its height; the theatres were men and giving little thought to any danger over-hanging country. 2 Before artiving in England I my- the situation. . I had followed the war| from beginning with the intens interest; 1 had read practically every- | thing printed about it in the American official information as| the At-| lantic. The result was that, when 1} gailed for England in March, I felt| ittle fear about the outcome. All the | fundamental facts in the case made it! impossible that the German could win the war. Sea-power rested | practically unchallenged in the hands of the Allies; that in itself was an ab- | solute assurance of their ultimate vic- |} tory. 1 had read in the American press all the statistics of shipping | and, while such wanton de- | struction of life and property seemed appalling, I could see.nothing in these figures that was likely materially to alter the result. Indeed I regarded it as would end before the could exert any material influence up- | on the outcome, My conclusions were | shared by most American naval o cers whom I knew--students of .wa fare, who, like myself, had the utmost respect for the British fleet and were entirely of the world -in-its keeping. altogether likely that the war] United States | willing to leave the future Yet I had spent only a few days in London when all these Hlusions dis- 5 ._ | appeared. meeting in| placed before The British - Admiralty me facts and figures 0 cot which had not been given te the pre ng gentlemen, in civilian clothes, se- These documents. disclosed the ounding fact that Germany was win war, and winning at a rate hat meant the unconditional sur- render of the British Empire in four or five months. Jellicoe and 1 Confer, On the day of my arrival in London I had my first interview with Admiral Jellicoe, at that Lord, Admiral Jellicoe and I needed time the First Sea small man, and foreign press, and 1 had had ac-| frame as he cess to such was available on our side of THE DAILY BRITISH WHIG TA i Rs a J ¥ SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1919, \ By ADMIRAL WILLIAM SOWDEN SIMS | were his two most outstanding points® packed every night; | though few men had risen everywhere, indeed, of the upper classes of the blustering and, met. Physically Admiral Jellicoe is in mind, and there v Lord orzrr CECIL HARRIS LEWC no introduction. I had known him for many years and we or less regular corres: considerable period. I first made his Ae ain tance CT 57 ©, been more} nts for a in China in 1901, when was a captain and already zed as one of the coming men He was an expert gunnery, a subject in tly interested at the so rapidly | shaven face, women | in the Royal Navy, success had made | were apparently him only more quie unosténtatiously di their | nothing | about the Admirdl; esy, all 'brain, self had not ynderstood the gravity of | have ever t, soft spoken, and | calm, smiling, guified; there was {could never guess what was. going on seadog | in. his head by any outward emotion. he was all court- | of all the men 1] that the responsibility for the safety I hive known none of the more approachable, frank, and open- | minded. » up against him in tennis. His smooth } when I met him that morning in April, 1917, was, as usual, and imperturbable. One At this time it is vot too much to say Empire rested upon 1 find n this i British | Admiral Jellicoe's shoulders. | the absurd notion prevalent i is a | country that his change from Com yet he is as powerful in|mander of the Grand' Fleet to First | are | Sea Lord was something in the na- few men in the navy who can stand [ture of a demotion; nothing could be | in the Spring j further from the truth. As 1 Lord Jellicoe controlled the operati | not only of the Grand Fleet, but als {of the entire British navy; he had {no superior officer, for® the First Sea Lord of the Adm ty, positign-in-England that® corresponds jto our Secretary of the Navy, power to give the slightest leg {der to the fleet--a power | secretary possesses. Th Ig AS was the tim this _interview, there was nothing abot The Admiral's bearing whieh befrayed any depression of spirits | He did manif great--seriousne |' possibly appr nsion, but Britigh i stoicism and the us British refusal {to say die, wére keeping him tenaci- {ously at his job. ---- | i "The Germans Will Win--Unless." | After the usual greetings, Admjral | Jellicoe took a paper out of his drawer and handed it to me. It was a record of tonnage the last few months. This showed that the total sinkings, British and neutral, had! losses for | i | F | concerning of 1917 536,000 tons Yin Februar 000 in March, and that sinkings were - taking place in April which indicated the destruction of nearly 900,000 tons. These figures showed sses which 'were three ¢ 4s thase indicated by inconclusive : state- nts which were then being pub- 'd in the press. [ y that 1 was surprised by this § expressing it mildly. I astounded; 1 had never im- nything so terrible and T ex- »ssed my consternation to Admiral e, acrined agined & aid, as quietly as though he were discussing the weather anc not the future of the British Empire "It is impossible for us to go on with the war if losses like this continue." "What are you doing about it?" I asked "Everything that: we can. We are increasing our anti-submarine forces In every possible way, We are using every ble craft we can find with which to fight submarines. We are building destroyers, trawlers, anc other like craft as fast as we can: But the situation is very serious and we 1 need all of the assistance we can get." and four CTORY AT SEA general belief in British naval circles _§ that this plan would succeed. With losses approaching a million tons a month it was a matter of very simpld arithmetic to figure how long the Al4 lies could stand the strain. The authorities caleulated that the limit o endurance would be reached aboug November 1, 1917; in other word§ that unless some method of success fully fighting submarines could bel discovered almost immediately, Grea Britain would have to lay down he arms before' a victorious Germany. "What we are facing is the feat of Great Britain," said an Americar diplomat, then in London, after thd situation had been explained to him In the next few weeks I had many interviews with Admiral Jellicoe anc other members of the Admiralty. sat in conférence with them ever morhing, and, for all practical purd poses, became a member of their ord ganization. There were no secretd | of the British navy, to which, as an American, I did not have completa access. All members of the govern pment desired that the United Stated should understand the situation com< : | pletely, so from the beginning they § "It looks as though the Germans | were winning the war," I remarked. "They will win, ~ul:=ss we can stop th and stop them losses Adn 1 replied. lem?" 1 asked. "Absolutely now," Jellicoe d the work of none that we announced, He deserib- destroyers and showed no optimism over their ability to eon- trol the depredations of the U-boats. The stories that were being published the numerous sinkings of submarines | now found "to © untrue. Since the Scginning of the war, 'only fifty-four German sub- mapines were positively known to fave been sunk, and Admiral Jellicoe row told me that the. German ship- vards were tarnidg out hew marines at the Stories had recently found into print about the voluntary sur- render of German U-boats; ) surrender had taken place; German be the st.- Adrmiral, Orr Solr Sel licoe dpicturegiven 6 yf es to Marr irl Sims ER a Thor t Honorable soon," there no solution for the prob- | can see | devices by the thousands. sub- | rate of three a week, | their way | discussed matters. with the utmost frankness. They deprecated the gen § erally prevailing impression that any new invention could control the subd BB marine in time to be effective. Forty Thousand Anti-Submarine Devices . Those were the days 'when the American press was constantly calls ing upon Edison and other great Am4 erican inventors to solve this prob lem. In fact, inventors in every part of two hemispheres were turning out A regulad department of the Admiralty heade by Admiral Fisher, had charge of ind vestigating. their product; in a fowl months it had received and examin not far from 40,000 inventions, nond § of which answered -the purpose; §. though many of them were exceeds ingly ingenious. British naval offid cers were not hostile to such pro4 jects; they 'declared, however, that {it would be absurd to depend upon | no such | i new deyices for defeating the German campaign. The time element was the | important consideration; unless 'the { U-boats were checked in two or three { | months, the Germans would have | { won the war; should Mr. Edison or 1 BAZFoUR | Brrlrsh Foreign Secredysy. @ Photo HARRI, CEwiye, ies had been cireulated merely to preciate enemy morele. I even fun that members of the government w) chould have been weil informed, and clso British navai officers, actnally Lelimved thet ming ezptured Cevman submarines were carefully stowed away at the Portsmouth and Ply- mouth navy yards. The faet was that the supplies and communication of the forces on all fronts were threatened, that German submafines were eon- stantly extendi their operations farther and farther out into the At- lantic, that German rs were es- caping, that three years' constant operations had seriously threatened the. strength' of the British navy, and that Great Britain's control of pA sea was actually at stake. ' Bad as the situation then was, Ad- miral Jellicoe had every tion that it would get worse. The Ger- man submarines -would soon have the long daylight of the British summer ; for their operations, and they belfaved that the submarine would foree a da cision in their favor in that period. Bo far as I could learn there was a any other great genius invent an! anti-submarine - device, it would not serve their purposes, because, I bey fore it could be perfected and in< stalled, the shipping situation w ; have forced an Allied. surrender. S$ I discussed the situation with memd § bers of the Cabinet, such as Mr, Bald § four, Lord Robert Cedi and Sir Ed- § ward Carson. Their attitude to md | was very different from the attitude 3 which they were taking publicly, for § in thoir speeches these men naturally 8% would say nothing that would improve 8 the enemy morale; but in their talkd 88 with me they repeated practically == everything that Jellicoe had said, 14 was the seriousness of this situation, | of course, that sent Mr. Balfour and the British Commission to the United States. What a dark moment that} was in the history of the Allied cause!) Not only were the German subd marines sweeping British commered | from the seas, but the Germans werd also defeating the British and French armies in France. When we recall that the high peak of success with the U-boats was achieved at the very moment that General Nivelle's offend sive failed on the Western front, we | can get some idea of the real trag< edy of the Allied situation in the spring of 1917, j £ "Things Were Dark," Said Balfour, "Things were dark when I took thay trip to America," Mr. Balfour said tol me afterward, "The submarines were constantly on my mind. I could think of nothing but the number of hip they were sinking, All that time i . gertainly looked 'as though we were) | going to lose the war One of the men who most keenly]! realized the state of affairs was th King. I met His Majesty first in the) chancel of St. Paul's on that mem-} orable occasion in April, 1917, whe the English people held a thanks. | giving service to celebrate America's|t entrance into the war. On this, as 3 £ i i several subsequent mee King impressed me as a oe toons, anaffocted Ei e was dressed in ki, like a other English officer, and his a ner was warm-hearted, sincere, ev democratie. "It givés me great pleasure to meet Jou on an occasion like this," said Hid! Majesty, referring to the great An glo-American memorial service, " am also glad to greet an Admiral on such a mission as yours] And I Wish you all success." On that occasion we naturally h little time for an exchange of viewsf but a few days afte 1 was in vited to spend the night at Windsor Castle, King in his own ho proved even more cordial, if tha were possible, than at our first mee ing. Afteg dinner we adjourned to 8 room and there, over our cigars}f we discussed the situation at consid erable length. The King is a rapi and animated talker; he was kept constantly informed on the . rine situation, and discussed ft X night in all its details. I was he Ae sed by his fami Rutity "with alk na ions, i ' touch which he was @ really surprisi His Majesty himself is 8 alors in Io. early you he joined the navy, i Bich. he works up like any othe gt vy. e - weii informed Aor afmbst this was not ™ as about the oa