THE DAILY BRITISH WHIG Y SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1923/ BURNS' IDEAL BAKERY WHEAT BRZAD THE STAFF OF LIFE W. BURNS 61 Frontenac St., North Phone 1826... A lt. At et, tt et ett oa st WOMAN'S HEALTH RESTORED She Claims Lydia E. Pinkbam's Vegetable Compound Did It After Everything Else Failed oarioe) tha case. aid barely do my house- work and washing 1 80 run-down, from ba Bry took a cof medicines and | doctors. Then I gave them all up and took dia E. bam's egetable Com- and FOCH, AFTER CLASH WITH HAIG, ACCEPTS HIS PLAN FOR BiG DRIVE 'DeWar Explains War's " Greatest Myth "That! French Generalissimo Worked Out British Victories. | Canadian The seven months of initiative, | whith the Germans had held on the { Western Front, ended in July, 1918, and at once the advance of the Allies to victory began. So this is not an unsuitable occasion for referring to [ the myth that when, in the summer of | 1918, the British troops advanced | triumphantly they did so because at | length they were directed by consum.- | mate genius--and that this genius did | not emanate from our own leaders, but from Marshal Foch! That aspersion on British leadership | | has been described as the greatest | myth in the war so far as the Western | | Front is concerned. More and more one is convinced eel | hen examining the evidence that the I f good | now. 1 every- . thing that comes and we all take when we don't = [ ged thankful for what the Yogeiable Compound has goon fo Erte ei A wazion. Wino! oY he tly hoe from the a thks poe AE ax- pressions of gratitude. For nearly fifty Lydia E. Pinkham's Vegetable Eommpoudbas been sopmainehy uae MR mim a L. C. HEMSLEY from RH. J. ROGER WATOHES and CLOCKS REPAIRED at shortest notice 149 8ydenham 8t. Phone 20864. sms YAP MACHINERY TORONTO private rooms, (Your own lock and key.) " PHONE 5326. 209.805 QUEEN STREET. | civilian authorities at-home in August | and September, 1918, did not under- | stand the nature of Sir Douglas Haig's | wonderful series of operations; and ! that they possessed at hand nobody really able or ready to help them in this. In the latter half of July, 1918, French and American divisions coun- | ter-attacked the Germans, threw them | back, and took from Ludendorff the | initiative, On August 8th the British, in turn, struck on the Amiens front and threw | the Germans back on to their 1916 | line south of the Somme, roughly the Roye-Chaulnes line. "As a result of this attack, as the | Despatch shows, the Paris-Amiens rail | way was disengaged, the connectipn between the French and British Ar- mies at length quite secured, and the | enemy's jumction at Chaulnes brought within our gunfire. Foch now requested Haig to attack the enemy in this Roye-Chaulnes posi- tion at once. He was anxious to sec- ure Peronne if possible, with the rive: crossings to the south of the town and the high ground east of it. The British Commander-in-Chief or- dered further reconnaissances on Aug- ust 13th. These bore out his earlier conclusion that the position on thed Roye-Chaulnes front was most formid- able. Clearly the Germans resistance had stiffened here. Therefore, he wrote to Foch, stated the facts, and let it be known that he was not prepared to at. tack the Roye.Chaulnes position. At the same time Haig outlined an- other and quite different plan of attack, one starting farther north, in which the Third and Fourth Armies would be able to co-operate, and the First Army a little later to join in. He preferred science to the sledge-hammer. Foch did not concur. He was bent on the Fourth British Army continu- ing and pressing the attack forthwith ' south of the Somme. So a conference between the leaders was necessary. It was held at once at Sarcus, and attended by Foch and Haig with their Chiefs of Staff. The iwo proposals were considered. No secret shall here be made of the fact that the argument was keen and | controversial. How could it be other- wise, seeing that both leaders believ- | English Leader's Strategy for Triple Allied Offen. sive a Tremendous Success. Engineers, by Notable Skill, Bridge the Scheldt--With Splendid Courage Americans Face Certain Death. ) By George A. B. DeWar. ed absolutely that their respective pro- posals--which were of a wholly diver- gent character--were right? The 'British Commander-in-Chief in the end difinitely declined to continue the attack on the Roye-Chaulnes posi- tion. And Foch accepted in its entirety the British Commander-in-Chief's plan He abandoned his order . that the British Army should attack the Roye- Chaulnes position. He eventually pro- mised to attack simultaneously with the French Army over a wide front in order to work -in 'with Haig's plan, which was to start in a new sector. And there is reason for saying that, not long after, the French Higher Command admitted that it was behold- en to us in this vital matter--as truly it was! That is what one expects in good soldiers; it is deep in their train. ing. Haig's new offensive at once began to achieve what he intended and what he and his staff and Army Command- ers had thoroughly studied well be- forehand, The series of battles, started by the small and modgst-looking operation on August 21st, 1éd on to the storming of the Drocourt-Queant and the Hin- denburg position$ and did all their ori- ginator had hoped. Ultimately they enabled the Allied Armies as a whole to advance, So as a result of these victories in August and early September, the Bri- tish Commander-in-Chief resolved to bring the whole striking power of his army to bear on the retreating enemy. He was "out" for a decision, and be- lieved that it could be reached before the close of the year 1918. At the end of August and early in September Foch and Haig discussed the strategic aims for their future ope- rations, Before this date Foch's plan of campaign had been of a quite limit- ed character, consisting mainly of pos- sible strokes for freeing several im- portant railways, such as the Paris- Amiens line which the battle' of Aug- ust 8th secured. Byl-now the moment had come to enlarge and co-ordinate the operations"in order ta reach a de- cision. Foch's plan had been that the Ame- rican Army, after an attack in.the St. Mihiel salient, Id pass thence to an offensive ag the enemy in the Briey coal-fields; the French them- selves attacking in Champagne; and the British advancing against the Ger- man centre at the Cambrai-St. Quentin front; whilst British, French and Bel- gian forces: combined were to attack in Flanders and advance towards Ghent with the object of clearing the Belgian coast-line. The design was full of fighting spi- rit, but it was crude. The American forces in moving eastward towards the Briey coal-fields would be engag- ing in a drive away from the Allied centre and left! It would mean an ec- centric rather than a concentric move- ment against the enemy, and would | By Lieut-Col. J. H. Boraston, C.B. render his retirement far easier and safer, Such was the British criticism of the plan. Hai proposed that the Allied right should, instead, attack and ad- vance towards Menines the Ameri- | can right resting on the Meuse. In| this manner the offensive of the whole Allied forces would be of a gonverg- ing nature. | Foch concurred with this British emendation; and on September 3rd he issued his Directive 3537 on these lines. The whole Allied plan of opera. tions thus took a grand and really scientific form. The chart accompanying shows the disposition of the opposing forces on September 25th, the eve of the triple offensive. The general strategy of the? combined operations can be clearly seen. : The shaded area again represents the Ardennes and adjoining country of si- milar natural characteristics, which lie like a rampart between Germany and France. The main trunk line into Ger- many and the important lateral south | of the Ardennes are also shown again in conventional fashion. On the right, south of Mezieres, will be observed the Argonne offerisive ready mounted, waiting for the mo- ment of assault on the morrow. The reader will note the heavy concentra- tion of French divisions in Gouraud's| Fourth French Army, 27 infantry di- visions, and ' the no less powerful grouping of American and French di- visions on Gouraud's right, 12 U. S. A. divisions and 4 French. It will be re- membered that in rifle strength the 13 U. 8. A. divisions were equivalent to at least 30 French divisions. Opposite this formidable mass, which for purposes of compatison can | 'be reckoned at from 60 to 65 divisions, are 19 German divisions and 1 Austrian division, and of the 19 German divi- sions only 6 were first-class troops. In Flanders, the northern offensive is also ready to strike on the 28th, though 3 French cavalry divisions are | still on their way to the battle area. The map shows the location of Gen. Byhg's command, north of Albert. The task with which the British Ar. mies were faced on the St. Quentin- Cambrai front was from every point of | view far more difficult than that which the French and Americans had been asked to perform in he Argonne bat- tle sector. The Argonne battle had been launch- ed with an overwhelming superiority of force. The British Armies were called upon to attack an opponent more numerous than themselves. The French and igans enjoyed the ad- vantage of taking their énemy by sur. prise, at any raté to a material extent. On- the British front the Germans had already been fighting an unbroken bat. tle for a period of seven weeks and ex- pected attacks from day to day. It was with an Army less strong numerically than that which had sur- vived the German spring offensive that the onslaught was made upon the most powerful, most important, and most strongly held of the enemy's de- fences in the west. | At 5.20 am, on the morning of Sep- 'their deep dugouts and from the shaf tember 27th the right of Horne's First Army and the lest of Byng's Third Army moved forward to the attack. From start to finish the battle pro- ceeded with almost mathematical pre- cision, of a front of thirteen miles from Bedu- camp to' Oisy-le-Verger, oug/Afroops advanced to a depth of four niles. On the 28th the area overruw'was extend. ed southwards to ipefude Gouzeau- court, northwards 6" Palluel and west- wards to the ScHeldt Canal. Over 10, ky BOLLAND On this first day, on the greater papt] 000 prisoners and 300 guns were taken by us in the first day's fighting. It were presumptuous to comment here upon the extreme skill and ability with which this most difficult opera- tion was prepared, controlled and dir- ected by the First Army Commander and his staff. The fact speaks for itself if terms of sufficient eloquence. It may be worth noting, however, as ' supplementary evidence of the thoroughness and forethought of the preparations and the skill and energy of our technical services at this date, that by 9 am. on the morning of the attack Canadian Engineers had com- pleted four two-way bridges over the great Scheldt Canal cutting, and by 6.30 p.m. three trestle and pontoon bridges in addition. Needldss to say the successful development the assault depended directly upon the speed and completeness with which such works as these could be carried out. The part the 27th American took in the assault on Gillemont Farms should be mentioned here. On the | 20th the American infantrty attack on this front was launched from assembly position 'as much as 1,000 yards be- hind the line from which the barrage started and was mown down by mach- ine gun fire from -the strong. points that should have been captured two days previously, It was stated to the wrifer at the time at the mistake was pointed out to the American units; concerned be- fore the battle and that y were urg- d to alter their artillery arrangements. The reply said to have been made was that it was all right becatise American infantry were accustomed to march four miles an hour and would soon catch up their barrage. A distinguish- ed American staff officer who visited the battle-ground immediately after the fight brought back word that on this front the American dead lay in long orderly lines, a tribute to the high spirit and splendid courage with which they had advanced to certain death, Yet even so, the strength, energy and fighting spirit of the American soldiers was fot to be denied, and in the first rush bodies of troops made great progress. Contact aeroplanes sent back word that American detach- ments had been seen at an early hour so far east as Gouy, and high hopes were entertained of a great success all along the line. Then the experience of the Somme 1916 and of other early battles was re- peated. Eager for the attack and confi- dent in their powers, the main object of many of the American rank and, file would seem to have been to keep in front of the Australian troops, whose duty was to pass through them to carry on the attack. They went straight ahead, as the troops of the 8th British Corps had done in 1916 and forgot to make sure of the positions they had overrun. After the first flood had passed by, the. German garrisons came ts connecting their trench line with' the turinelléd canal. They cut offthe re. treat of the American troops who had passed beyond them and engaged in a desperate struggle with the Australian divisions who, with no artillery bar- rage to keep the German machine guns under Cover, were forced to use all their battle craft to fight their way forward and make good the beach in the"sduthern half of the tunnel sector. This they succeeded in doing, so that at the end of the day's fighting, despite all misfortunes, the central sec- tor of the Hindenburg line had been broken through on a front of five miles, The events of these three days on the St. Quentin-Cambrai front put al 'BRMANY out of" new complexion upon the military sit- uation in the west. At the end of October the great con- ception of the triple convergent offen- sive was on the point of realization. In spite of the vast withdrawals he had already carried out, the British ad. vance had beaten the enemy in speed. When on November 9th the German wireless announced the abdication of the Kaiser and the Crown Prince's re- nunciation of his claims to the Ger- man throne, the German Army jam- med in the Liege bottle-neck, was like a whale 'aground in shallow Water, trapped by its very bulk and able nei. ther to escape nor to defend itself. On the British front the war 'ended on November 11th with ga message from the ememy which may be classed as characteristic, namely, that a Bri- tish 'heavy gun was in action after 11 a.m. southwest of Binche. "Please stop firing." . By Geo. A. B. DeWar. No subject in the latter part of the war aroused much keener interest and discussion than "ur ity of command". Lord Kitchenor's Saree first to Sir John French, then to Haig, insisted on two cardinal points: (1) That closest co-operation between the Allied Ar- mies Commander-in-Chief was an in- dpendent one not to come under the or ders of any Allied general further than the necessity of such co-operation might compel, In his final report Pershing says, "As our troops were being trained for open warfare, there was every reason why we should not allow them to be scattered among our Allies even by divisions, much less as replacements, except by pressure of sheer necessity, Any sort of permanent amalgamation would irrevocably commit America's fortunes to the handsy of the Allies." That is not meant as an argument against a'generalissimo®- Pershing ap- proved the March 1918 arrangement: But it is.an argument against anything like dictation: ie. the powers of a generalissimo must be restricted. At the Beauvais conference on April 3rd the three Allied Govern- ments, at the suggestion of Haig, de- fined the powers of the Generalissimo more exactly than had been done at Doullens. He was entrusted with "The stregical direction of military operations, The'Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French and American Armies will have full "contgol of the tactical action of their respective ar- mies. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the right of applying te his Gov- ernment if in his opinion the army is endangered by any order received from General Foch." Such was the final form of "unity of command." The arrangement work- ed out on the whole well, thanks to the soldiers. It is not impertinent to ask whether some corresponding formula might not have then applied to the} statesmen who arranged the peace terms. 7 Pure Linen Towels Pure linen towels are essential to people of refined taste whether the towels are of the finest weave or are for everyday use. 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