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That 5 a sorry show i when posed as a ' hero, but neverâ€" I theless his fight 5 may have been 2 , just as plucky i and bold as that l 1 crowned victor. More ' aure he decided by accidents than of courage or of tactical skill. taking up the actual fighting ! his ships and Dewey’s fleet I mile old admiral lets out some crets. It is well known that .35 warned to the extent that ‘ uld have prepared to defend mics, and Montojo affirms that Spain‘s naval attache in Wash- kept his government supplied I 9 military plans of this gov- l He also says that the mili- mval chiefs of Spain told that war in Spain’s state of dness was absurd. ble navy of modern ships' modern guns, with torpedoes l equipments up to date in na- in did not possess. Specifical- Iares that he and his captains gainst fighting for the defense hilippine harbors. And Cer- 9" 'T SPANIARD LA) l he says together with his told the government on April that the war must be decided ea. Therefore. Montojo con- he order to Cervem to sail to [Indies was in effect an or- livide what little sea power assessed and venture frag- ;ainst the Strong fleets of the tates Reasoning thus, he as- Lt the war really ended when left the Cape Verde islands to :Atlantic. inrove.” says the admiral, though years passed without] ’rnment doing anything for the l of the Philippines and alâ€" 7 all these years the army and manders had petitioned that be done. until 36 days e declaration of war no was sent to Subig, nothing the defense of the mouth of d even after that the things efense Were four cannon of 15 rs of 183.3. which even at that antiquated. The initial ve- our cannon was 510 meters e smallest cannon of the ene- h was 730 meters, and the (1 many of these on his ships. rdered to close the smaller en- Suhi: with ships expressly the purpose and to Close the Hill of the bay With torpeâ€" ;-h should have been sent. as e sent to Cuba. but which; ched us in the Philippines. 0 give an idea of our misera- ion I may mention that we 14 torpedoes for the defense eters of space and that the ‘ch he received in Hongkong long enough for five torpe- therefore only five could be Cl? 0 give an idea ‘ 'on I may me] 14 torpedoes fc eters of space ch we received long enough 1 an of Cavite as a military id Montojo calls absurd. He It Cavite is defenseless ,9nd R bay is the most convement gse of war. kials at Madrid, according *0 [Were warned by the naval It Washington that in the War the United States sqn. 'r ific waters would attack the s. Sabra] sent to Madrid de- tements as to the strength ’3 fleetâ€"the power, equip- strength in men and guns. before this reached Madrid abled that be had only the ’istina (flagship). Don Juan a, Isla de Luzon and Isla de Vith these and two cruisers aSked should be sent him be ‘dO something. although he 0W Dem,» y’ s strength. torpedoes were dispatched “Whine: but did not reach me but the government at f‘e it out that 150 torpedoes 91y on the way to Manila. lbushing this item the cm- ned Montojo that there were b0“ the torpedoes reaching ifouDd )Iontojo’s fleet in Ca- 1‘ as close as possible to the presence there is explain- OlFmpia, leading, circled “ring broadsides from her 8 into the forts, the Spanish mg aloof for the moment. a large White Spanish ship, “id to the flagship, with 11 board. left the Spanish Spain “'ns Not Ready e Philippine Harbors; ,- Doomed Beforehand. the Flagship. G. L. Kilmer.] DMIRAL MON- TOJO. the de- feated Spanish fleet captain at Manila, has at last been heard from in a. story which has no lit- tle fire in it. The under dog makes uue ana Started tor the Olympxa. The contest for the moment was between flagship and flagship, but the rest of the American ships quickly made a. target of the daring Spaniard, and she could not get to close quarters with the Olympia. A shell from the 8 inch turret rifle of the Olympia crashed into the Reina Cristina, exploded her forward boiler and set the ship on fire. The captain of the flagship and 60 of his men were killed by this shot, which actually wrecked the pride of the Spanish navy .n the Philippines. With the losses from other shots received it cost Mon- tojo the lives of 140 Spanish sailors to lay his ship against Dewey’s. Be- sides, over 200 were wounded. The disaster to their flagship did not stop the Spaniards from meeting the inevitable destruction gallantly. Mon- tojo hoisted his flag upon the Isla de Cuba and sent his two torpedo launch- es to do for the Olympia What his luck- less ship had failed in. Thoroughly alarmed, the American ships turned every gun that would bear upon the black engines of destruction. creeping so noiselessly yet steadily toward the heart of the fleet. One launch quickly blew up, and the other ran ashore with a dozen holes in her sides. These futile attempts by the Spanish flagship and the torpedo launches were about all of the aggressive movements of the Spanish ships. Montojo says that he and his captains knew that certain destruction awaited them. and they lay in hiding as far as possible for a turn of fortune in their favor. Montojo says he did not expect Dewey at midnight. but his fleet gunners and . the shore men were alert. The shore batteries were under his control and fired the first shots at the American ships. The presence of the Spanish fleet at Cavite instead of in Subig bay or at Manila Montojo explains by saying that the fleet was on the defensive. be- ing in no condition to cope with Dew- ey. His first hope was to save the ships by good luck and in case of fail- ure to fight desperately. Manila. he says. had no help to give him. and. be- sides. Dewey, being the stronger. as he knew. could silence his ships as well as the shore batteries of the city by simply threatening bombardment. And so. weak as was Cavite. it was the best place of the three for the protection of his fleet. He reached Cavite the day before Dewey appeared. The night was passed in preparing to receive the Americans whom the telegraph had announced as sailing for Manila. Montojo thinks that the claim that Dewey hauled off to give his sailors breakfast would be scouted by every military man in the world. He inti- ADMIRAL MONTOJ O. mates that Dewey may have supposed that the Spaniards would destroy their own ships or else gladly get out of the way of the Spanish cannon for a respite. Of the American methods in general Montojo sets forth their ter- ribly businesslike character. Dewey knew the weight of the Spanish projec- tiles as well as the distance at which he could safely fight. Dewey’s report says. “At 7 a. m. the admiral’s ship, the Maria Cristina. made a. desperate effort to leave the line and to fight at short distance. which made it neces- sary to concentrate all the batteries of the Olympia on this ship." Evidently the American was not anxious to come to close quarters with the pride of the Spanish navy. Montojo declares that the true solu- tion was for the Spanish squadron to save itself by hiding in rivers among the reefs. compelling Dewey to hunt ‘uv -v‘. up each ship separately. He would not have offered battle except under conditions wholly in his favor. But. he says, in order to adopt this plan he needed an order from the home gov- ernment or the governor general be- eausQ his abandonment of the sea would have exposed Manila to imme- diate bombardment by Dewey. The situation demanded that he take steps to lead Dewey to destruction. Cavitc offered the only chance. and the experiâ€" ence of the Baltimore with a shot from the Cavite forts shows what might have happened the "American fleet had it been compelled to fight at short range. The Spanish admiral. whose full name is Don Vincente ,Montojo y Tril- 10. has long had the reputation among military men, diplomats and foreign attaches of being an able warrior and a man of noble qualities. His personal courage is of the highest, as shown by his conduct at Manila Bay. IAIU Vvuuu“ w- -.-â€"_ Spain. according to Montojo. deceivâ€" ed herself While trying to keep from America the facts of the strong and widespread revolution going on in the Philippines in 1898. The existing revo- lution made the islands the more ”3b“? to attack, but the gOVernment‘ at Mad- rid ignored the danger at home and sent denials abroad; The military I119!) in the islands expected just What took Dlace. but their appeals for materials for defense fell upon dull ears. Guano]: L Km SOLDIERS WHO FIGHT AHEAD IN SPITE OF RULES. AMATEUR GENERALS. Great Leaders Have Ignored the Precept: ot the Art of War, Napo- leon Most of Allâ€"American Origi- nalityâ€"The Boer Commanders. [Copyright, 1900, by G. L. Kiimer.] ' APOLEON’S en- : emies and crit- f i c s W a r m e d ' themselveswhile V under the chill v,"- shadows of his 5 u c c esses by _ pointing out his unmilitary o r “fl am ateuris h ’1.)- methods. “ H 6 T7} violates e v e r y l ‘5' of war,” said th e Austrian generals during t h e campaign which ended in Austerlitz and opened the gates of Vienna to the victorious French. One of the most ambitious French historians of the campaigns of Napoleon sees in his military career nothing but a succession of terrible military blunders. Every chapter, aft- er telling what Napoleon did, goes on to show what ought to have been done. fifiaxaxhfiz : , " In the same way Grant violated the art of war at Vicksburg by making a circuitous march to the rear of the enemy’s position, operating without a true military base and secure lines of communication and with an active ene- my having free access to his rear while his army was engaged in front. Sher- man said that he feared the result all the time, but was afraid to protest, and that he didn’t have any faith in the outcome until the army was lined up in front of the Confederate works with guns bearing upon them. Then light dawned upon him. Had Grant died in the latter part of May or early in J une, 1863, the Vicksburg campaign would have ended in a grand fizzle and would stand in history as belonging to the kind to be let alone. But nothing succeeds like success, and the cam- paign stands out as a marvel of gen- eraiship. Napoleon really made a new art of war. His amateur methods overturned the rules laid down in books and themselves became new rules. He was trained in the schools: but, genius that he was. he made war for the purpose of winning battles, not merely to play a stilted game, and he invented puzzles which the enemy could not solve. Napoleon’s Marengo campaign was a notable instance of‘ his audacious con- tempt for the rules of the military art. He conveyed his army by critical ma- neuvers to the heart of the enemy’s territory in the rear of his lines and was in a position to be crushed should his foe prove wary. In fact, he was practically defeated at the close of the afternoon of the day of Marengo. Op- portunely Desaix’s division came to the field from an expedition oif on the flank which Napoleon’s critics say was needless and came near leading to dis- aster. This fresh command was hurled against the Austrians, who were con- fident that the French were routed, and the tables were turned in a twin- kling. The most sharply criticised of Grant’s battles was that of Shiloh, and Marengo and Shiloh belong in the same category as far as actual tactics go. At one stage of each of these bat- tles the ultimate victors were whipped. But they didn’t give up as whipped. and therein lay the innovation of the victorious commanders. It is a mili- tary saying that a good general knows when he is whipped. He should also know when he is not whipped, al- though the rules of the game might say that it was time to quit. Generals like Napoleon, Grant and Lee have ev- ery advantage over real amateurs in that they are schooled in the art of war, the same art as their opponents, and hence may lay guesses as to what the enemy will do. In Stonewall J ack- son’s time Lee often violated one of the simplest and most imperative rules of the military art. That is the one which forbids the dividing of forces in the face of the enemy. He did this at Antietam and lost the campaign. At Chancellorsville he did the same thing and won a rousing victory. At An- tietam it was done by reason“ of over- confidence brought on by an easy vic- tory at Manassas three weeks before. At Chancellorsville the situation was desperate, and Lee threw all upon one hazard. Fortune favored him. and the ‘rule still stands paramount in military i books and has been quoted against the | British again and again during the war tin South Africa. Stonewall Jackson was an innovator, and, although well schooled in the art of war. he broke the rules oftener than any other general of modern times Who came of! with an enviable reputa- tion. At Port Republic and Cross Keys. in the Shenandoah valley, he was in grave danger of being crushed by two opposing armies, and he fought two‘ separate battles the same day, dividing his troops and re-enforcing one division from the other as occasion demanded. It has always been held that Jackson was fortunate in having inferior gen- erals opposed to him. but even in that case he must be given credit for know- ing it and taking advantage of it. His opponents at Port Republic and Cross Keys were men of military experi- ence. and the one who was deceived the most had had exactly the same school training in war as Jackson. Soldiers like Oom Paul Kruger. Jou- bert and Cronje may be set down as amateurs, but they have had experi- ence in war among military men or school training. Besides. they have had trained soldiers to coach them and books without end, as well as an am- l'oition to , learn all that books; can teach. let the! have made records N-WARDER: LINDSAY. ONT: which the schools will take into ac- count even though the result be against them in the end. Sam Houston was an amateur when he gained the independence of Texas by a decisive victory over the trained regulars of Santa Anna at San Jacinto to the same extent that the Boer lead- ers are amateurs. He had seen mili- tary service in a subordinate capacity and had been a student of Andrew J ackson’s style of warfare. Singularly enough one must go back to the battle of Marathon to find the precedent for Houston’s tactics at San J acinto. And the great Miltiades was the hero of that battle, the one whom Houston, doubtless unknowingly, imitated. One is equally thrilled by the audacity of the Athenian commander at Marathon, Houston’s marvelous courage at San Jacinto and Napoleon’s habitual bold- ness in knocking down all the set rules of art. And Houston’s work was as scientific as that of Miltiades or Na~ poleon. He didn’t blunder into a suc- cess, but watched a favorable oppor- tunity to strike and then, in the face of all his advisers, “let slip the dogs of war” with a vengeance so dire that Santa Anna was glad to lay his sword at the feet of the Tennessee backâ€" woodsman. whom he saluted as “the Napoleon of the west.” Buller has been condemned by critics for attacking all along the line at Tu- gela river. He was beaten at that des- perate game, and hence the book rule against it will have a double force un- til some daring general knocks it over. One of the chief of the leaders in our civil war attacked all along the line again and again, and, although he jus- tified the method on the whole. he ad- mitted that in one very grave instance it was a mistake. His justification for the method, reduced to plain English, was that he had men enough to war- rant the sacrifice, and the moral effect upon the enemy was well worth the cost. If England is going to overrun the Boers with numbersâ€"and that seems to be her only way out of the diflicultyâ€"attacks all along the line must become as frequent in South Af- rican campaigns as they were in Vir- ginia in 1864. Methuen’s methods up to and includ- ing Magersfontein were decidedly ama- teurish. An analogous case may be cit- ed from the civil war in Pope’s Vir- ginia campaign. Pope coined the phrase, “Headquarters in the saddle,” and he tried to live up to the idea sug- gested by abolishing proper military bases, lines of communication and the‘ designations “spent" and “rear.” Me- thuen’s attitude seemed to be that all the other British generals had failed, and he must set the example of whip- ping the Boers and relieving a be- leaguered city. Whatever he thought he acted as though his mind was run- ning all the time upon the phrase, “Kimberley or hades.” He found hades. Methuen’s amateurishness lay in his rushes into the enemy’s territory and attacks without reconnoitering. If the Boers 'chose. they could make the ground between Orange river and Magersfontein another Shenandoah valley from the Potomac to Strasburg on the road to Staunton. It depends Wholly upon the man on horseback Whether rules of art can be safely ignored. Genius maintains so firm a grasp upon the situation that the mere fact of a mishap here and there does not count in the long run. He is the greatest general who organizes vic- tory out of mistakes. And the man to do that is the rare soul who under all excitement and vicissitudes keeps his head. Not the least among the quali- fications of the self trained and self made man is the faculty of self con- trol. His character is formed in fight- ing obstacles. Therefore an obstacle more or less, as the loss of a division or a fresh division hurled against him in a crisis. does not count. On the oth- er hand. the general who fights by the book is put out it one point in his plan fails. In his field the Confederate general Forrest has'no superior in history. His raiding command fought as an army. He originated the branch now called mounted infantry and the method of fighting it. His force was mobile and would gallop over the country, dis- mount. charge breastworks and be of! like the wind. Forrest was a strate- gist. He would plant himself in the interior of the enemy’s country. com. pel a concentration of forces to cope with him, then make off through a loophole thus left open. Once he was caught at the game. but that only dem- onstrated its hazardous nature. and his frequent successes in the same movements showed his genius. For- rest not only had no military training. but he was illiterate, an instance of native genius trained by circum- stances. “Getting thar first with the mos’ men” was his summary of the art of war. When warned that the ene- my might get in his rear, he exclaim- ed, “Well. when we turn round won’t we be in their r’ar?" All in all, the civilian Boer generals have shown the capacity needed for all the stages of the game thus far devel- oped in South Africa. They carried the war into the enemy’s country for both political and military reasons. They have never lost their heads and pushed their men forward against the defeated enemy. It is an axiom that when you tread on the tail of a fleeing snake he’ll turn and fight. In war the pursuers are quite as likely to become rattled as the pursued and may go too far to draw back. In another sense the Boer leaders have shown masterly skill in holding the fire of their men. It might be said that this is a sine qua non of defensive warfare. The British must force the fighting. The enemy is on British soil. So that Joubort and Cronje and the rest may stand quietly upon the de- fensive, like a calm pugilist with a nervous antagonist. and let the foe wear himself .out jumping about to reach a vulnerable point. GEORGE L. KILmnn. SIX (- ‘9‘ A fought Oct. 21, ’wns a tactical victory for the English, but it was one of those which, too often repeated, wreck the cause of the victors. In oth~ er words, while the British held the battlefield it wasn’t worth holding, and they abandoned it between two days, leaving their wounded in the hands of the Boers. The fighting at Glencoe was brilliant on the part of the British, but turned out to be valor wasted because the force engaged could not sustain itself alone north of Ladysmith. It now transpires that General White was or- dered from London to hold on at Glen- coe and Dundee. In the fight General Symons, commander of the column, was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the Boers. A squadron of the Eighteenth hussars and four sections of mounted infantry were cut off and captured. One battalion lead- er, Colonel Gunning, was shot, and 12 out of 17 officers of his command fell. BATTLE DISASTERS. After the fall of General Symons his sueccssor, General Yule, abandoned the wounded and made a hasty night retreat to Ladysmith. taking his men in minus their kits and sadly demoral- ized by their experience. The loss of about 200 men in the hussar capture at Glencoe staggered England at the time. but she has become used to it by subsequent disasters of the kind. 0n the 30th of October came Nicholson’s Nek, an incident or the campaign around Ladysmith. In order to clear the hills in front of the town of dan- gerous Boer batteries General White led a strong column against the main Boer position and sent out a detach- ment under Colonel Carleton to strike the enemy’s flank. Carleton had six companies of his Irish fusileers, four companies of the Gloucestershires and Mountain Battery No. 10. Month and Si fore fl Astounding beyond belief was the re- ‘ port that this party had been captured entire, but General White, in announc- ing the fact, explained that it was due to a mule stampede. which carried off the infantry ammunition. Later re- ports show that while the mules did stampede they carried along with them the valor of the men as well as the ammunition. Fortunately it was night or the Boers might have slaughtered the party to a man. The officers suc- ceeded in rallying the men, and just as the Boer scouts were beginning to ap- pear Colonel Carleton got his line upon a convenient kopje. or small hill. and prepared to defend himself. Gradually the Boers surrounded the hill, taking position at rifle range upon opposite hills. They outshot the Gloucester- shires and took their vantage ground from them and soon commanded the plateau whereon the British vainly I sought cover and were soon hemmed in. Accounts of the gallantry of the Irishmen must be credited, for there were 300 killed and wounded. It is said that when the die was cast the or- der was given. “Faugh a ballaghs (clear the ways). fix bayonets and die like men." Then there was carnage for a. few minutes, and the order to cease firing was repeated many times before the Irishmen grounded arms. The number surrendered was 870, in- cluding some wounded. For a month after Nicholson’s Nek the war went on around the besieged cities, Ladysmith. Kimberley and Ma.- [Copyright COLONEL CARLETON. GENERAL YULE. GENERAL GATACRE. feking. England rushed troops to South Africa under able generals. and three columns moved forward for the relief of the ill starred cities. General Gatacre was stationed at Moltono. in Cape Colony, to guard the British base against surprise, and, learning that there was a force of Boers at Storm- burg. he led 4,000 men against them. The march lay over rocltlantis and veldt. and the column had reached its destlnation, within a couple of miles, when it was suddenly fired-upon. tron“ .>Em< Impâ€"mm ml... “.0 mumâ€".32“â€" 02.223Fw Terrible Reverses For Each :h 01'! the Warâ€"Crack Troops Star Leaders Went Down Be- the Mighty Boer. >pyright, 1900, by G. L. KilmerJ mN VAIN unhap- and Hank by a. toe hidden from View. The Royal Irish rifles had the ad- vance of the line, and, when struck by Boer fire, the battalion took 1'0 cover behind a kopje, Where it was soon J'éin- ed by the other troops. But it soon transpired that the shelter was itself under the fire of Boer cannon; A. break for cover half a mile distant from the kopje was necessary in order to escape annihilation, and the with- drawal was made under cover of two British batteries. Finally the lines were deployed for open battle. A de- tachment of British attempted to flank the Boers, but turn which way they would the hapless English faced Boer Mausers or machine guns. The affair ended in a rout, with the Boer artillery pounding the rear of column. Gatacre lost 631 killed, wounded and missing. He was defeated by two unknown Boer leaders, probably heads of com- mandoes or regiments. A disaster which followed close upon the heels of Stormberg was that of Magersfontein, Where Methuen’s relief column was checked and hurled back by the Boers under General Cronje. Cronje has held up, during this war, the reputa- tion he made in capturing Jameson’s raiders. After Methuen crossed the Modder in the face of an apparently determined opposition on the part of the Boers he was expected to rush into Kimberley some day without serious encounter. He started forward on the 10th of De cember, but on the highroad to Kim- berley the Boers were found intrench- ed. The ridge where the Boers lay ter- minated in a spur, and the highland brigade, under General Wauchope, marched during the night to a position close to the spur under orders to at- tack at daylight. When they tool: up the advance on the morning of the 11th, all was still, but a strange light was seen moving in the direction of the Boer lines, and soon a single rifle shot was heard. Perhaps a second aft- er the rifle shot, evidently a signal, there was a storm of Mauser hail let loose upon the devoted highlanders at 200 yards. The fire was not alone from the direct front, but in the flank along the line of march. General Wauchope’s friends claim that he protested against being sent to slaughter without reconnaissance. It is. GENERAL HART. GENERAL WAUCBOPE. GENERAL WARREN. plain that his brigade was led into a deathtrap. He was killed. and. al- though there is talk of the rallying of commands and successive charges. yet there was nothing to charge upon but a sheet of hurtling lead. One highland- er confesses that his regiment ran back 500 yards. There were attempts to re- cover the ground originally held by the highlanders. All day the British ar- tillery shelled the ridge. and. with sup- ports, some of the highlanders advanc- ed; but, according to the London Times, this brigade. after losing its command- er and three colonels killed, drifted back without orders, and there was no further attempt to advance. Methuen. withdrew to Modder river, having lost 963 killed and wounded. It was the middle of the forenoon when the Gordon highlanders attempt- ed to repeat at Magersfontein their Dargai Ridge exploit by attacking the- Boer kopjes from across an open plain. Midway of the flat they struck a barb- ed wire fence, and there Colonel Down- man fell. A dozen yards from the Boer trenches was another barbed wire ‘ fence with a strand chin high. No wonder that the slaughter at a few hundred yards was frightful or that the confusion in the ranks was fatal! Soldiers are only human. Methuen’s disaster at Magersfontein was followed by the terrible fiasco at General Buller’s first attempt to march to the relief of Ladysmith. The worst feature of the disaster at the Colenso-a crossing was the loss of artillery. But for that Buller would have forged ahead, and perhaps the staggering losses of General Hart’s Irish brigade there, as well as that of the highland- ers at Magerstontein. would have been» eclipsed by the carnage in some de- voted command. At Colenso the losses. of the day fell chiefly upon General Hart's Irish brigade and footed up» 1,119 killed and wounded. When Buller telegraphed that War- ren; perhaps the abiest general in South Africa, would attack the Boer- key at Spion kop at night. it seemed as though the British had at last learn- ed how to take advantage of the foe’s single weaknessâ€"that of natural leth- argyâ€"and the stroke might succeed. All turned out well until the British were fast under the muzzles ot' the Boer guns, and then the slaughter com- menced. The Britons stood it all day because that was safer than retreat. but they didn’t let the second night pass without retreating. and so the deâ€" cisive disaster of the Tugelaâ€"Lady- smith campaign ended the series of six which marked the first three months of the war almost to a day. Wapen’s. loss was about 800. The assaulting force numbered about 2,000 to amo. - . GEORGE L. Km L 11