Yonge and Charles stroets. Toronto during the last two months has been more than four times our supply. Enter now. Catalogue free. â€" - -\_. 1v 7 0L The school is thoroughlv equipped in teaching ability, in chemical and elec- trical supplies and ï¬ttings. etc., for full Junior Leaving and Matriculation work. .l‘HOS. ALLAN, Principal and Pro vincial Model School Teacher lst Class Certificate. Intending Students should enter at the beginning of the vemu if possible. Board can be obtained at reasonable rates. Durham is a healthy and at- tractive town. making it a most desir- able place f’? r residence. The record of the School in past years isa flattering one. The trustees are progressnve educationally and spare no aims to see that teachers and pupils ave every advantage for the p10- per presentation and acquistion of knowledge. FEES : $1 per month in advanc" Durham High School REV. W. H. HARTLEY, J. F. GRANT, Hez Porter, whose chief claim to notice these days is the frequency in Which he figures in police rec- ords, is back again at the old standâ€"Governor Miller’s guest for the next three months. It happen- ed this way. Hez went to Palmer- 811 n With a trunk and returned with the same piece of travelling goods, containing four cases of whiskey. Inspector Beckett is wise on weights, and the trunk was heavy. Resultâ€"four cases of booze in the inspector’s possession, and Hez out of the business for the next three months. Porter is susv pected 01 being the runner for a dive which the police have in their watchful considerationâ€"0,3 Times. . . ' , i' 22 Applications in 2 Weeks 7 IN one on The Managenwnt of This College re- ceived 22. app’inatinns in two weeks in October. On Monday. Nov. lst, alone, We hml 7 applications for Bookkeepers and Stenographers. Demand for help is in excess of sup- AI‘ ply. Now is the tiiuve to enroll. All our Graciuates in positions. \Vrite for free Journal and particulars at ODCP. MOUNT FOREST BUSINESS COLLEGE D. A. McLACflLAN. G. M. HENRY, President. Principal. The Demand f0 J. Ennwï¬thiï¬im Yonge St. 23; yds. long 40 ins. wide 50¢: pair 273 yds. long 4?. ins. wide 75¢ pair 3yds. long 4? ins. wide $l.00 p lit 3 yds. long 4? ins. wide $1.50 pair All curtains have the new ï¬nish- ed top. Fine English Crepes. white and fancy 150 per yard Table Linens at 25c, 50c and 600 Grey Cppton §heeting 2: yards wide at 2.56 per yard. - Hemy Bleached Sheeting, .. ’yds. wide ate-100 pet y and. Heavy 11-4 Flannelette Blankets white and Grey $1.50 pair Heavy 2-4 Flannelette Blankets white only $1.85 pair Our New Spring Prints are now in. Call and See Them. New Spring Goods w. H. BEAN Big4 Machine Oil. Harness Ou, Ame Grease and Boo; Ointment. go w 3. P. SAUNDERS you Want a Position when you complete a. Course ‘3 A. TRUNK OF BOOZE. He Sells Cheap LACE CURTAINS BlG4 ELLIOTT Chairman. The darnessm aka tes of the ‘V L eta I‘ c GERMANY WILL BE ON “ LAST LEGS†BY MIDWINTER By Hilaire Belloc in Toronto Sunday 1 World. ‘ It is. true to say. and must he repeat,- ed. that with every week that passes the enemy’s effort will be more and more political and less and less strate- gic. It must he so in the nature of things. For whenevera man’s reserves are near their limit. in any struggle. whether in some ï¬nancial contest or in strength. as in a Wrestling match, or in numbers. as in this case of the enemy in the present great war. he has only two policies open to him. Either he must throw the last of his energies into one supreme effort which will almost invariably include diver- sion to another ï¬eld of the more di- rect methods hitherto attempted. or he must try and husband his strength and use it sparingly in order to spin it out. If there is any conclusion from the present position to be drawn more crearly than another it is that those who now govern the whole of our al- lied enemies unchecked and uncriticiz- ed from one united command have put their money upon the former of these two policies. It is a point. which has already been emphasized in these col- umns and which must be repeated. for upon our judgment of it will very largely dept nd, not only our apprecia- tion of the present phase of the war, but of its possible duration and of its probable political conclusion. _ LL24. A-“A--'_“:A_ AA- t But there are in this calculation cer- tain elements which. tho they have been repeated over and over again un- der the best authority and with ela- borate arguments and citation of evi- dence of facts to prove them. have not vet sunk into the public mind and do not yet niolg puhlic opinion. I i Pe’opie still talk as tho the calculao tion of enemy numbers and of remain- ing enemy resources were a piece of private amusement indulged in at ran- (10111 and leading to any number of various conclusions. I, therefore, once. more this Week. at the expense of some considerable repetition, because I believe it to be the chief interest of this moment, return to that general statement of the enemy’s resources as compared with those of the allies, which is at the basis of all judgment of the war, and further allude to the objects the enemy had in view in beginning this Balkan adventure. and show Why those objects may be re- garded as political and strategical in so far as the two can be distinguished. To begin at the beginning. A na- tion puts into the field for the prose- cution of the war certain forces divid- ed into units. that is. corps, divi- sions, brigades, batteries, squadrons. battalions. It is compelled by the very nature of military organization to arrange its strength in this fashion. It doesn’t say. “I have a million men available. I will train and equip them and put them into the field.†\Vhat it says is. "I will put only so many units into the ï¬eld as it can maintain there at full strength thruout the probable course of the war in spite of the prob- able rate of wastage.†For as the men of the various units are. put out of action by death, capture, wounds. and illness of every kind developed on active service. their places must be taken by fresh men who have been trained and equipped behind the arm- ies, and who in the meantime may he called â€the nation‘s reserve of man power.†In the old days when nations fought? with professional armies it “as not’ the full national reserve of man pzwer‘ which was considered. but the prob-l able number of recruits ohtainablej and trainable and capable of equip-’ ment under the system of those times. f Today this mass behind the ï¬ghting. units is equivalent to all that young," manhood of the nation which can be spared from work necessary to the} munitioning and equipment of the: army and to the economic mainten-ï¬ ance of the state. \Vhen we talk ofi "a decline of the eï¬'ectives†of an)" army. what We mean is not that theI enemy is reaching the end of his men l but that because for one reason or! | another the reserve of man power he- I hind the armies is giving out. Either‘ .the units have got to be put on to a ‘lower establislunentâ€"e.g., battalions once of a thousand men are to be re- garded in future as counting only 750 menâ€"«or whole units are eliminated in order to keep up the standard of others, e.g., the efl'ectives of the 10th} corps are distributed between the Sthj and 9th to bring the latter up to full‘ strength, while the 10th as a unit dis- appears. . The latter expedient is ob- viously the more clumsy and much the rarer. The former course is com- monly followed. And after a certain point when the reserves of men are exhausted an enemy’s eï¬'ectives begin to decline. From these elementary considera- tions it follows that the limits of a nation’s reserves depend exactly upon the military task it has undertaken â€"â€"that is. the number of units it is proposed to put into the ï¬eld coup- led with the rate of wastage in those units: and the number of units it is proposed to put into the ï¬eld depends either upon the task imposed upon it by others or imposed by a. task it has ambitiously chosen of its own accord. For instance. Great Britain in the South African War was dependent up- on voluntary recruitment, but it had from this source reserves virtually in- deï¬nite in men compared With the numbers of the enemy. The rate of wastage was such and such and could not only be repaired but the number of the units in the ï¬eld constantly in- creased. Prussia and her vassal states in the war of 1870 had only to put against the greatly inferior numbers of the French so many units as, at the rate of wastage then suffered. could be amply supplied with men for a much longer time than the war lasted, and Prussia at the end of the war was stronger in trained and equipped men than she had been at the. beginning of it. Now, in the present war the enemy has, partly of its own choice and partly from the necessity of repelling the threat of invasion in certain quar- ters. mainly because of the political results he expects from the prosecu- tion of such an ambition, undertaken the holding and even the extension of certain fronts which involve him in a very heavy expenditure of men. He has over 500 miles to hold in the west, He has a line to hold in the east. which is generally put down at 800. but which. in all its convolutions. is nearer 900. He has just opened a. new mander in straits for eflectives is line in the southeast of about 200. He tempted to have recourse to inefli- is, at any rate. actually holding well cients. Pretty well every campaign of over 1500 miles, and the number of exhaustion showsb thesbeefin thle1 ï¬eld units be r uires for this is corre- 1n Increasmgpum ers ore t 8 end spondingly queat. His rate of wast- comes, but It IS true to say that; age is quite out of proportion to the them verypresenee 1n the ï¬eld hastens experience of past wars, with this ex- Instead of delays the breakdown of ception,that the wastage from sickness the force Wthh 1s suï¬erlng from th an amount we can onl estimate and last stages 0f att rition.’ . , ’ Em which we have noyexact ï¬gures) Whether the enemy s declme m ef- is less than it used to be, or, L0 be fectives were to come towards the : more accurate. the permanent wastage end of November or towards the. end from griemus sickness is less. of January really mattered very httle. _.._ -. '11:“ mkn‘n n‘nnn mnui‘A kt; fn nkonhfln in We know from ample intelligence supplied to the bureaux of the allies what the rate of wastage is. The enemy has to ï¬nd about a million new men every two months. There is no doubt a certain discrepancy be tween the drafts he is ï¬nding and the total permanent losses, the latter be- ing the smaller ï¬gure than the for- mer, but amounts to about four-ï¬fths. While the enemy has to ï¬nd half a million a month somehow he need not write down his absolute permanent losses as more than 400,000 a month, and the difference between the two ï¬gures is represented partly by the somewhat increasing permanent mar- gin of temporary losses. Take it at the lower ï¬gure and consider only the men whom he has to replace for good and all and you have not less than 400,000 a month. This ï¬gure is arriv- ed at by all sorts of ways and invari- ably comes outâ€"within a very little margin of errorâ€"at the end of the statement or calculation. and it tallies with the corresponding rate of wast- age of the Other armies of which these same bureaux have private informa- tion. We need not waste time over the sort of people who, in their vague dread of the enemy, en'low him with supernatural powers, expect his wast- age to be incredibly less than that of the allies, and his opportunities of re- cruitment to be in some miraculous way indefinitely superior to that of the rest of mankind. He is fighting the same kind of war as are the allies, in much the same fashion. He has about the sune numbers per million of men who can be equipped and trained usefully, and he is losing about the same numbers per million. Fur- ther, the general reader must special- ly remember that the figures thus ar- rived at by very numerous independ- ent authorities, working along every possible line of evidence, are the only serious basis for a judgment. General opion relies in the matter upon evi- dence inï¬nitely worse. (Several corre- spondents have called my attention to a public statement that there are “nine or ten million Germans alone of military age left.†It is quite true â€"or, rather. there are more. Five are in the existing units or on communi- cations; two are maimed or incappaci- tated by illness. Nearly all the rest are those rejected by the doctor or re- tained for civilian work. Now these calculations thus inde- pendently undertaken by men trained to this kind of evidence and attaining it in a degree altogether out of pro- portion to the little trickles of infor- mation that a civilian population pos- sesses with regard to the enemy. do not indeed come to an absolutely pre- cise number nor fall within a margin of error of a few thousands. It would be a miracle if they did. They differ between the maximum and the minimum by something like a million. and that munds like a very large. mzugin of eum. and it wnulgl be in aux “a1 but this ; but it me: ms. measu led in time two months or a \91)’ little more than two months. In other words. if you take an esti- mate of that one of the numerous calculations which gives most latitude to the enemy. which most believes in his powers of resistance. if you couple it with that one which is most sceptical as to his rapid rate of wast- age. if you couple them both with that one which allows for the very largest number to he returned to efliient ser- vice after being in hospitalâ€"if you weigh all the scores against the Allies - you arrive, for the date when the enemy’s effectives will decline, at somewhere about the turn of the New Year or a very little later. Say the end of January at the very latest More reasonable estimate, less violent- ly weighing the scales against the chances of the Allies, reduces that time to the course of December, while esti- mates which have very great authority behind them, but must be admitted to be at the hopeful end of the line, place the turn of affairs in the month of November itself. It is quite clear under such circum- stances that the enemy some little time ago arrived at a point where he had to consider his whole position. During the summer, while he still ex- pected a decision against the Russians and a separate peace with themâ€"and while his successes in the east were presumably permitting him to negoti- ate secretly with the Kings of Bul- garia and Greece to tie them down to their present actionâ€"he still hoped for a conclusion of the war before his elfectives should decline. It is fairly well authenticated that the head of the enemy’s government proposed Oc- tober as the conclusion of the cam- paign. Once it was apparent that he would not obtain his decision. then the approaching decline in his effec- tives became as a matter of sheer necessity the chief matter for his con- Sideration. its reseryes could keep up the num- bers of human beinge present in the ï¬eld by arming those hitherto rejected by the doctors, by arming boys, by using in the ï¬eld elderly men hitherto kept back as instructors or upon com- munications or in hureaux. and by armin even older men hitherto ex- empte from all military'service. The moment you begin to take in bad ma.- terial you can increase your nominal eï¬ectives pretty well indeï¬nitely, but you do so at the expense of your real strength. A hundred men, of whom 25 are ineï¬cient, is a. much weaker body than 75 eï¬cients. This is a. practical point on which one can an- peal to any man who has had prag- tical experience. The 25 inemcients cannot be merely eliminated, leaving you with 75 emcients. On the com trary, they break down in batches.- hamper your mobilit , and ‘ confuse every arrangement. very student of military history knows that the com- It is hardly necessary, let; us hope, to emphasise a point once more which hasbeen made so frequently in these columns as that concerning the main- tenance of effectives by insufï¬cient material. It should be self-evident: phat any power reaching the end of - vâ€"vâ€" vâ€"vvâ€"vâ€"vw Whether the enemy’s decline in ef- fectives were to come towards the end of November or towards the end of January really mattered very little. His whole plans would be to change in view of the fact that his decline was coming within a brief delay and al- most certainly now before a decision should have been obtained. Compare the position (if a speculator I in some ï¬nancial affair. He has thel money to, do his work up to a certain| date. He is conï¬dent that he will bring off his adventure before that date. He fails to do so and he ï¬nds the rate of his present expenditure will exhaust his funds in two months or three, or four, and with no prospect of his original scheme coming otf in that interval. It does not matter to such a man whether the moment of exhaustion is as a fact exactly two months off, or three. or even four. It is coming quickly, it is within measur- able distance. and on the old lines the position cannot be retrieved within that interval. He is compelled to change his plan radicaily. and that is precisely what the enemy did some time back when he decided that he had failed on the Russian front and prepared a new move. .. -- i ‘ What the enemy’s new move, due to approaching exhaustion of his ef- fectives, has been, we know. Ithas been the essentially political stroke of the Balkans. Political rather than strategic for reasons described at length last week ; because it necessar- ily introduces div:rgent aims in the alliance; because it in particular dis- turbs opinion in this country; (just as it is hoped to do by the Zeppelin raids which are absoiutely useless in a mili- tary sense and are uniquely designed to disorder civilian opinion). It re- introduces the quarrels and jealousies of the Balkan States. The numbers which Germany and Austria can put upon the new front, and have at great risk managed to put upon this new front in the southeast (where an arrow indicates the Allied relief to Serbia and a note of interro- gation our ignorance of its size) are almost insigniï¬cant compared with those upon their main fronts. There is but one strategic or purely military object connected with the new move, and that is the possibility of the enemy’s training, arming and sup- plying a certain number of Turkish units. either not already in existence, or. if in existence, ill supplied. _ _ Upon what scale he can do this we are ignorant, but we know that it is on no scale that can seriously threat- en the grand alliance. It would be a far more serious thing for further neu- tral states in the Balkans were on ac- count of the new move to join the enemy’s side, but even they cannot munition at the rate required for modern artillery, and Germany and Austro-Hungaxy are already in the rate of munitionment SUPPaS°ed by the western allies. They will throw nothing serious into the scale beyond what they have within the boundaries of their own fronts. The position of the great) war is surely clear enough in its large lines. If we grasp those lines as 3. “711018. we do not. indeed. see the future. for that is forbidden to man, hut we have the elements of a. sound judgxflent and We can see the trend, it' not the end. 0f evvnts. V' \ Lavu' The enemy’s effectives cannot be ixiziintained at their present strength beyond a date upon which the com- mzmders of the Allies slightly differ, but which no one puts later than quite the early part of next year nor earlier than next month-November; and perhaps the close 01' that month. ---- . . _ 1' I ' L-AA_ _-L' l"""'l"' “" " That is the great cardinal fact of the moment. As against this the enemy keeps up but does not increase his production of munitions and equip- ment; while the Allies, not yet so much as in sight of a decline of their elfectives, already his superiors in the rate of equipment and munitionment in the west, are increasing their rate of the same in the east. on the sympathies of civilized man- kind: “ Her freedom and her power have for more than twenty centuries been annihilated; her people have de- generated into timid slaves; her lan- guage into a barbarous jargon; her temples have been given up the suc cessive depredations of Romans. Turks and Scotchmen, but her intellectual empire is imperishable. . Wherever literature consoles sorrow, or assuages pain; wherever it brings gladness to eyes which fall with wakefulness and tears, and ache for the dark house and the long sleepâ€"there is exhibited, in Meanwhile, the enemy is throwing away men more lavishly than ever be- cause his higher command has decid- ed that a violent expenditure of energy in this crisis is better policy than hus- banding his remaining reserves. In connection with this policy, he has also created a new diversion, largely political, in the Balkans with some 5 per cent. of his forces. and could at the most, were his success complete in that direction, slowly train and still more slowly equip some unknown numberâ€"perhaps half a millionâ€"of men drawn from the subjects of the Turkish Empire. While this experi- ment is being made in the southeast of Europe he is being hammered conâ€" tinuously upon the Western line; he is losing great masses'of men (for the equivalent of ï¬ve army corps have gone in the last three weeksâ€"to October 9‘ â€"â€"allowing a proportion of l in 5 casualities for the dead); he is failing in exceedingly expensive coun- ter-offensive strokes, and on the east he is at last held. LIV Au luv 15va “‘7- That is the situation as a. whole, and the moxe steadily we been it in mind and base 0111 judgment upon it the better for the nerves of the nation. GREECE ANCIENT AND GREECE MODERN Less than a hundred years ago Mac- aulay in one of his brilliant essays in the Edinburgh Review,“Mitford’s His- tory of Greece,†sketched with double perspective the existing condition of that country and her continued claims, by reason of her ancient heritage, up- 5m its noblest form, the innnortal inï¬u ‘ ence of Athens.†. THE RECOVERY or GREECE i Since these words were written. and ; almost before Macauly himself had : passed away (1859), Greece had shown I signs of recovering from her ruinousi condition, and in our own day, thanks to the sympathetic attitude of Great Britain, France and Russia, and their active co-operation with her against Turkish domination and misrule, she, like her neighbor, Italy, and largely from similar causes, has once more taken her place among the nations of: Europe to the great gratiï¬cation and abounding hope of all who had an ap- preciation of her ancient power and glory. and the large part which under wise guidance she might still play in the world. Nobody, we dare say, would have rejoiced more than Mac- aulay. before the outbreak of this war, ‘ to have seen the complete reversal in a half a century of his dismal picture which Modern Greece then presented. ‘ She is now nominally. at least, a freel and independent country, with a con- ‘ stitutional monarchyâ€"the executive, consisting of the King and respons1ble Ministers. Legislative power is in the hands of the Bule elected by manhood suffrage for four years. A GRO\VING MODERN LITERATURE. Military service is compulsory, and she has a very considerable army and navy and mercantile marine. Educa- tion is free and compulsory between i the ages of ï¬ve and seven ; and large provision is made for secondary and university education. Her language can no longer be fairly called “a bar- barous jargon,†and the Greek news- papers in their native tongue, which circulate to some extent in Canada! can be easily perused by anyone ac- quainted with Ancient Greek. She has also a growmg and vigorous my tive literature, and her poets, his- torians and novelists have won the applause of competent critics thronghout EurOpe and America. Macaulay’s sneer at the manner in which some choicest remains of An- cient Greek architecture and art were lost in the Aegean and others sold by Lord Elgin in 1816 to the British 'Museum. where they are now seen al- most every day to the deli ht of thousands, may be foex§otten ; gar un- less this had ha pen to them they would by the urks, following their general practice, long ago have been converted into lime to plaster a hovel or a cowshed. GREECE WINS INDEPENDENCE. The history of Modern Greece may #0090ooooooooooooooooooooo9909909¢¢¢¢¢¢¢o§¢oooooo¢¢n f§¢§§§§§§§§¢§§§§§§§‘§§§§Q§ #0§§§§§§§§§¢§§§§§O§§OO§OOO OWO¢§O§â€OOOMâ€M§†090 QOQONQâ€Â§M§§W 0009090099600000000009990909.0099999999999990699999o Opposite the Old Stand Cheaper Than the Cheapest The People’s Mills If possible I wish to dispose of my entire stock before the end of the present year, and if prices at cost and below cost will move the buying public then our stock Will he sure to move. “’e are determined to get rid of it. so we advise you to see for yourself. The stock consists of Dry Goods including. flannellets. blankets, “'(mlltin goods, men’s underwear. ladies under- wear. men’s pants and overalls. ginghams, nmslins and ladies" and gent’s sweaters. Call and get, 0111‘ Moving Sale pricw. for you. Eggs am on hand. Farmers and Stock Owners should lay in a quan- tity of this Excellent Conditioner for Spring and Summer Feeding. Nothing equals it for Young Pigs, Cakes, Etc. Makes Milcn Cows Milk and puts Horses. in prime et'mdition for seeding; in fact it makes eVerything go that. it’s fed to. Although it; advanced $2.00 per ton wholesale we are selling it at the same old price. £2.00 per single sack, $1.90 per sack in half ton lots and $1.85 in ton lots. I Everything in our line at lowest prices for Cash. Bram? Shorts, Low Grade Flour, Chop of All Kinds, No. l Hay. etc., kept con= stantly on hand. Eclipse, Sovereign and Pastry Flour and Rolled Oats Breakfast Cereal 5me ï¬-‘m‘r‘ .‘ï¬L' 1.. JOHN McGOWAN TELEPHONE No. 8 (Night or Day) ALL MUST BE SOLD \Ve have a quantity of the celebrated S. SCOTT Molassine Meal 9 price» 'lhexe’ 5 money in it Egg. and Butter taken as ( ash. be said to have begun in 177â€, when attempts were made to throw off the Turkish yoke imposed upon it in 1456. when the country was annexed to the Turkish Empire by Mokammed II. The war of independence began April, 1821, and was practically ended by the Battle of Navarino. Oct. 20, 1828. when the Turkish and Egyptian fleet was destroyed by Great Britain, France and Russia. On May 7, 1832, Greece was declared an independent kingdom under British, French and Russian protection. G REECE’S OPPORTUNITY \‘Vhile then the co-operation of Italy with Great Britain, France and Rus- sia was warmly welcomed. not only for the material strength she brought in defence of the liberties of Europe against German aggressian and donn- ination, and of the integrity of the smaller States, but as an attempt to discharge a long-standing debt of gra- titude, it is easy to understand the profound disgust and distrust which the halting attitude of Greece under precisely similar conditions has in- spired throughout the Allied coun- tries. Perhaps it is not yet too late to hope that Greece of her own free will may once make the cause of liberty and freedom her own, and escape the deep damnation that is sure to come upon her in case of national ingrati- tude. Do not the voices of the dead and of the living sons of freedom at this hour call upon Venizelos to leap into the breach proclaiming: ~‘A land of slaves shall ne’re be mine. Dash down yon cup of Samian wine." G, H. R. in Toronto Mail and Empire. Many in Durham praise the sim- ple mixture or buckthorn bark. glyoemime. etc†known as Adler-i- 1m. This remedy is the most THOROUGH bowel cleanser ever sold- " ' ' y in .a flaw. ONE SPOONFUL DURHAM PEOPLE PRAISE SIMPLE MIXTURE November 11, 1915. Durham, Ontario